As the popularity of formal analyses of legislative activity in Latin America grows, so does the importance of understanding the limits of the estimates produced by such analyses and the methodological adaptations necessary when using these measures to make formal comparisons. This research note details the considerations involved and demonstrates their significance with an empirical example using the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate. This empirical analysis leads to conclusions that are the opposite of those in the literature, suggesting that such formal comparisons across institutions need to be made with care.
seeking to correct for measurement errors in latent variable models. Presently, the context is comparison, but scholars have endeavored to make improvements to measures of democracy (JACKMAN and TREIER, 2008) , how changing standards affect measurements (FARISS, 2014) , and to improve how we measure transparency (HOLLYER et al., 2014) .
Calling attention to the difficulties in making formal comparisons across legislative arenas or similar institutions is not new. Bailey (2007) and Treier (2011) both highlight the misleading inferences that may result from comparisons of this sort when scholars do not include the methodological adaptations necessary. In fact, these adaptations are conceptually very simple. If we consider the basic Bayesian Item-Response Theory (IRT) model, employed in this context by Clinton et al. (2004) and others, we can see clearly the basic requirements for making valid comparisons of different institutions. This model may be written as:
where is a matrix of recorded nominal votes, with i indexing legislators and j votes, in which = 1 indicates that legislator i voted 'yes' on proposal j, and = 0 otherwise. Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function, leading to a probit model. is the 'discrimination' parameter of the model and the 'difficulty' parameter; is the ideal point of legislator i, which may be understood as her preferred location in the policy space, a space of usually of one or two dimensions (JACKMAN, 2001 In the present context, the scale is constructed from the voting behavior of the legislators as compared to one another; two legislators who never vote the same way will be on the two extremes of the scale, for example, whereas those who vote similarly will be placed along the same region. space. This is the most valid method for doing so, and cleverly exploits a native feature of the Brazilian political system. However, as Bailey (2007) Bernabel (2015) finds the opposite -how are we to know which finding is correct?
To productively compare these houses, we must place both on a common scale, as noted by Bernabel (2015) . In order to do so, we must know which proposals were voted on in both houses, and on which versions of the proposals the houses voted, and which are common to both houses. Exactly how to do so will differ on the specific context. In the current example, we can exploit the common votes in the National Congress and use these votes as a means to 'bridge' between the two houses. These votes are coded as being the same item in the database and therefore the two sets of legislators are linked by their voting on these common votes. The analysis may then proceed using all the remaining votes from both houses in one common dataset.
This method is the same as that proposed by Desposato (2006) , but leads to opposite findings. As mentioned previously, there is no evidence that Desposato (2006) treated the common votes in the National Congress as the exact same item, and I can only surmise that the difference in the findings presented here is down to this important detail.
The specific set of votes that were used to bridge the houses is that of the Medidas Provisórias (MPVs, Provisional Decrees) issued by the Executive and voted on in the National Congress. Many of these votes happened sequentially, although in a few cases the vote in the Senate happened at a later date (see Table   1 ). However, given that the voting is indeed sequential in the National Congress (DESPOSATO, 2006) , it is therefore not perfectly simultaneous, and this difference in time between the houses should not make any obvious difference. The Senators are aware of the result of the Deputies' votes in either case, and while it may be possible that the external political context shifted so rapidly as to change the probability of a 'yes' vote in the second house, this is unlikely for the small number of MPVs involved in the years analyzed . All other non-unanimous votes in both houses were then used in the normal manner, from one large conjoined dataset, once the bridging votes were coded as such.
There are of course other ways to bridge legislatures. One method is to use the legislators themselves, as in Shor et al. (2010) . In the Brazilian case, voting behavior could be analyzed over several levels of government -from municipalities to federal legislatures, and as such is an interesting avenue for (1) e0007 -6/13 ideal points are considered below for both houses. Claims in the literature lead to several hypotheses, the first being H1: there is no significant difference in voting behavior across the two houses, as argued by Desposato (2006) . This can be operationalized by examining the difference in means of the ideal points in both houses and the magnitude of the difference through a Bayesian version of the 'ttest' for two groups (KRUSCHKE, 2013). Some have posited differences in parties across the two legislatures, in particular that the PMDB, the 'Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro', has differing factions depending on the house (ZUCCO JR. and LAUDERDALE, 2011). Our second hypothesis is therefore H2: there is a significant difference in party voting behavior across houses, in particular the PMDB, which is operationalized in the same way as H1. Desposato (2006) and Bernabel (2015) also disagreed on party cohesion within these legislatures, with the former finding more cohesion in the Chamber and the latter finding the opposite. This suggests H3: parties in the In order to test these hypotheses, I utilize methods detailed in Kruschke Were the differences zero in any legislature, we would see that some part of any one of the histograms touches zero. As can be clearly seen, not only is this not the case, but all the distributions are quite some distance from zero. Hence
Hypothesis 01 finds no support -voting behavior in the two houses is quite clearly different, with only Lula's second term in the 53 rd legislature coming anywhere close to zero.
To assess the magnitude of this difference, we can examine the 'effect size' of the difference in these mean ideal points, which is the difference in the means of the two groups, taking into consideration the variation within the (1) e0007 -8/13 groups 1 . Figure 02 shows effect sizes for the six terms considered. Legislatures 48, 49 and 51 -the presidencies of Sarney, Collor, Franco and Cardoso -have effect sizes of close to 0.7, meaning that there is roughly a 76% probability that a deputy from these periods was to the right of a senator from the same period 2 .
Legislature 52, Lula's first term as president, displays an effect size of 0.955, meaning a probability of 82% that a deputy in this term was more to the right than a senator. The smallest effect size is to be found in Lula's second term (a roughly 62% probability), whereas the largest, an enormous -03.06, is found in Cardoso's first term, in which it is virtually guaranteed (99.9%) that a senator was more right-wing than a deputy of the same period. These effect sizes demonstrate that the findings of Desposato (2006), of no clear and consistent difference between the houses, cannot be supported. Figure 03 plots the effect sizes of the differences in parties between the two institutions for the legislatures considered (the PT is plotted only in the 52 nd legislature due to the low number of senators the party had before this period). As can be readily observed from the graph, the effect size for the difference in the PMDB across the two houses is the most moderate of the three large parties, with this pattern changing only in the 52 nd legislature. Among the four parties graphed, the PFL is the one that seems most split between the houses, at least until the 52 nd legislature. Hence hypothesis 02 receives support for all major parties except the PMDB. The 'extremity' argument of Bernabel (2015) , that senators within each party vote more for the party than deputies of the same party, is the inverse of Desposato's (2006) claim that the parties in the Senate are less cohesive. One way to examine these arguments is to analyze the standard deviations of the t-test for a difference between the party means of both houses. Greater standard deviations translate to less cohesion, as the ideal points of the individuals in the party are more spread out in this case. The results are that there is exactly one instance of a party more cohesive in the Senate than the Chamber -the PFL in the 52 nd legislature, supporting Desposato's (2006) findings and contrary to those of Bernabel (2015) . These results are shown in Table 02 . Columns three and four show the spread of the 95% HDI for the posterior distributions of the standard deviations of the Chamber and Senate, respectively, and, as can be seen from a comparison of these two columns, parties in the Senate have a wider HDI; they are therefore less cohesive. 
Conclusion
I have shown in this research note how the results of a formal comparison between two legislative institutions can differ greatly depending on the methodology employed in making the comparison. Indeed, the findings presented here are in many cases the opposite of those in other studies. For methods such as ideal-point estimation, where we are creating scales of measurement, it is imperative that positions on such scales are made properly comparable in order for us to avoid the possibility of making incorrect inferences. It is also worth noting that the points raised here apply as well to studies that compare subsets of the voting database to the whole, for example, in the comparison of foreign policy voting with voting on domestic policy. As ideal-point research on legislative institutions grows in Brazil and other countries in Latin America, it is important that comparisons are properly made.
Of course, the substantive question of why these differences exist between upper and lower houses is an interesting avenue for future research. Using the (1) e0007 -12/13 methodology espoused here, and in Bailey (2007) , Treier (2011) and Bailey et al. (2015) , will ensure that the comparisons we make are as accurate as possible.
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